2024 · SAFECOMP / 2025 preprint · PhD Researcher, University of Twente
Satellite Safety-Security via Attack-Fault-Defense Trees
Developed semantics and cut-set metrics for attack-fault-defense trees and applied them to satellite mission risk analysis, aligning safety and security requirements.
Research focus
Safety, security, and formal methods for cyber-physical systems.
Safety
Fault Trees
Security
ADTs
Formal Methods
SMC · PRISM
CPS risk evidence
AFDTs · SMC · MDPs · strategies
Problem
Satellite ground-segment risks combine accidental failures, malicious attacks, and defenses that interact rather than stay in separate safety/security silos.
Context
Mission-critical satellite operations, with a case study around Ground Segment as a Service and industrial aerospace collaboration.
Method
Applied attack-fault-defense trees to model attacks, component failures, defenses, inhibition relations, and qualitative mitigation paths.
Result
The case study shows how joint attack, fault, and defense modeling exposes mission-level dependencies that separate analyses can miss.
Why It Matters
Mission resilience depends on understanding how a safety failure can amplify security exposure, and how defenses affect both paths.